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Law’s Ends: On Algorithmic Warfare and Humanitarian Violence  
Sara Kendall, University of Kent1 
 
 
The laws of war have always answered two questions: When may one wage 
war? What is permissible in war? 
And international law was always given two completely different answers 
to these questions, depending on who the enemy is.2 
 
How international law might relate to new technologies and regulate their practices 
had been a pressing question long before the use of armed drones challenged 
conventional conceptions of warfare. In traditional accounts of armed conflict, the 
confrontation between enemies takes place on a terrestrial battlefield where the 
prospect of casualties is common to all parties. Technological developments produce 
asymmetry between parties, whether through new forms of ammunition, aerial 
bombardment by plane at the turn of the twentieth century, or contemporary drone 
warfare, and the effects of these asymmetries in a postcolonial frame have been 
widely documented.3 Emerging algorithmic and machine-learning technologies 
present further challenges, not only to the political dream of their regulation by law 
but also to the juridical form itself and its humanist presumptions. 
Law’s temporal horizon, which adjudicates past events while aspiring to 
regulate the future, presumes a human relationship to time that these technologies 
bypass through parsing it in intervals that are not cognizable to human perception.4 
When humans are unable to observe the phenomenon to be judged, human law lacks 
the optics to apprehend what lies beyond its reach. Writing in 1963, Hannah Arendt 
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observed the anthropocentric way in which technological developments in space 
exploration made it unlikely “that man will encounter anything in the world around 
him that is not man-made and hence is not, in the last analysis, he himself in a 
different guise.”5 By contrast, the prospect of algorithmic warfare suggests a limit to 
the anthropocentrism of human law, evoking a runaway creation that cannot be 
contained by the order that produced it. 
Against this backdrop, the title of Gregor Noll’s contribution poses a 
provocative question: does algorithmic warfare suggest the end of law? Here war by 
algorithm is also understood materially, manifesting in the development of lethal 
autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), where machines would be responsible for 
targeting decisions rather than a human “in the loop.” Noll contends that focusing on 
machines diverts our attention from the broader frame of digitalized forms of warfare. 
We should not overemphasize the threat posed by the material form of LAWS, he 
argues, but instead critically consider the conditions through which LAWS emerged:  
“the thinking that shapes them,”6 including algorithmic forms and the phenomenon of 
code. Noll answers his structuring question of whether it is possible to subject 
algorithmic warfare to law in the negative, arguing that artificial intelligence (AI) 
cannot be brought within law’s normative order. 
This chapter begins from Noll’s philosophical claims about the underlying 
thinking that shapes AI, such as the self-learning algorithms that comprise it, as well 
as their consequences for closing the space of human judgment presumed by law. 
Building upon these concerns, I turn to the substance of the law of armed conflict or 
international humanitarian law, situating it historically to illustrate that even if it could 
grasp the phenomenon, this law would replicate and perpetuate the asymmetries that 
have accompanied its historical development. The humanitarian dimension of this 
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body of law is applied biopolitically, securing particular populations to the detriment 
of others, as seen in practice through the allegedly “distinctive” and “proportionate” 
use of drones.7 Building upon critical accounts of international humanitarian law’s 
origins and practices, I address the distinct temporality of these emerging weapons 
systems. The logic that shapes algorithmic forms aims to condense time into intervals 
beyond the capacity of human response, and the objective of LAWS to supplement 
human cognition threatens to exceed the laws of their own creators. 
As a means of condensing time in response to perceived threats, algorithmic 
warfare reveals a preemptive rationality. I conclude with a possible alternative: to 
recast preemption as an ethico-political exercise of human judgment. In their 
autonomous lethality, LAWS would foreclose human judgment on the battlefield. As 
with the US military’s “Project Maven,” considered here, resisting this foreclosure 
calls for a collective political response to interrogate and unsettle the processes that 
contribute to the emergence of autonomous weapons. At the time of writing, war by 
algorithm appears as an imagined future, but one whose prospect becomes 
increasingly likely through incremental technological developments in intelligence 
gathering and analysis that may not treat autonomy as their objective. Enhancing 
warfare through algorithms and machine learning in the name of humanitarian ends—
such as more precise targeting, leading to more proportionate numbers of casualties—
may in fact hasten the amalgamation of a violence that law is unable to contain. 
 
Law’s Ends 
Considering “the end of law” as Noll does invites two questions: what do we mean by 
“end,” and what do we mean by “law”? We might think of law’s end as a kind of 
closure or termination, when law is incapable of diminishing or regulating forms of 
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violence. But law’s end might also refer to its telos or objective. Here law’s telos may 
in fact be the production of a world where its enforcement is no longer necessary. In 
the political dream of perfect compliance, law’s subjects could police themselves. 
Does it then matter whether its subjects are humans or machines, or indistinguishable 
within a shared cybernetic relation? What would legal subjectivity look like beyond 
the human? When subjects inaugurate their own laws, are they more likely to comply 
with them? If autonomy signifies the unity between the law-giving and the law-
abiding subject, then at an extreme of this logic, LAWS may no longer appear as a 
threat but rather as a perfect state of self-regulation, as auto nomos.8 Questions pile 
upon questions as we contemplate an imagined future that can only be addressed 
speculatively, and from the limited horizon of the present. 
The first understanding of law’s end foregrounds the limits or failure of law, 
whereas the second suggests its ambitions. The scholarly literature on LAWS reveals 
a deep anxiety concerning law’s capacity to respond to these weapons: they are 
harbingers of a dystopian future that law must adapt to if it is to remain relevant; more 
specifically, they must be brought under international humanitarian law; they should 
be banned or controlled by treaties; accountability mechanisms for LAWS must be 
established; they are ethically unacceptable; they must always be governed by 
“meaningful human control.” Shared principles emerge across these different 
accounts. For example, one recent publication argues for adopting preventive security 
governance frameworks through international law,9 another for developing ethical 
guidelines to ensure the presence of “meaningful human control.”10 Autonomous 
weapons must not operate as “LAWS unto themselves,” but must instead be 
subsumed under a law not of their own making.11 Such approaches illustrate the 
paradox that Noll points out: “An autonomous weapons system subjected to the 
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heteronomos of the law would no longer be an autonomous weapons system at all.”12 
The ancient Greek heteros refers to the other of two, and here a difference is drawn:  
the nomos of autonomous weapons systems is not the nomos of law, and in this sense 
law’s end is its failure to subsume algorithmic warfare under its own categories. Put 
another way, law offers no Grundnorm that governs beyond human cognition, as law 
and AI “appear to belong to different normative orders,” if AI can indeed be brought 
under any normative order.13 We seem to have arrived at law’s limits. 
The second understanding of “law’s end,” as its telos, is more open-ended and 
multiple. To remain with the examples above, where law appears as something of a 
deus ex machina brought in to resolve a dystopian narrative drifting beyond human 
mastery, its end is to constrain or contain or to regulate violence. A particularly 
provocative illustration is found in the short film Slaughterbots, widely disseminated 
on social media, which ends with a call for a ban treaty.14 This commonly shared 
presumption concerning law’s objective or telos undergirds the law of armed conflict, 
often tellingly referred to as international humanitarian law. The dystopian narrative 
of LAWS is futural and speculative, but in this imagined future law’s end would be to 
bring LAWS under its authority or, put another way, within its (humanitarian) 
jurisdiction.  
Noll’s reading of law’s end in this second sense, as objective or telos, builds 
upon the distinction between the incarnate and excarnate. In the monotheistic 
normative frame supporting the legal order, he contends, the objective of law is to 
“incarnate” the external, a-corporeal, written command, code or statute—“excarnate” 
law—through study and compliance. Incarnating law in this way takes place through 
human consciousness, as has been the case from the emergence of monotheism 
through secular codified law, including the laws of armed conflict. In this sense, the 
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end of law as its ambition or objective—incarnation—also reveals its limits: law 
cannot be extended beyond human consciousness. Law’s two ends described above—
as either ambition here or as limit above—seem to meet within this reading, where its 
imbrication with human consciousness through study and compliance reveals the 
outer borders of its jurisdiction. We arrive at the end of a law unable to achieve its 
end-as-telos.   
The meaning of law at stake in Noll’s account excludes what cannot be 
subsumed under this structure of incarnation. Law is understood as guiding (human) 
behavior; for example, in the context of armed conflict, it is “a kind of call . . . to use 
weapons responsibly.”15 Responsibility is tied to human cognition (as with state of 
mind, knowledge, and intent), which is complicated by the shared agency of 
algorithmic human-machine assemblages. If law is a call, it operates rhetorically as a 
mode of address, directed to particular subjects who must be capable of responding to 
it and, in turn, of being held responsible. This mode of address is severed by the logic 
of code, where excarnate commands are directed outward “and made to act on the 
world.”16 Yet even as law’s call is embodied by the human subject, there is no rule for 
the application of rules: what is required is the even more thoroughly human capacity 
for judgment, and the response to this call by way of interpretation. The space of 
human cognition is arguably a space of judgment, where humans may respond to 
law’s call of proportionality by affixing ratios of civilian to combatant deaths and 
deeming them proportionate.17 There is a lingering question of whether the law at 
stake here—the law of armed conflict, or international humanitarian law—can be 
properly humanitarian in the first place, protecting the bare human irrespective of 
politics, history, and membership within a particular population. Noll illustrates how 
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LAWS cannot be brought under law, but even if they could be, what law is this, and 
what are its ends? 
 
Emplacing Law 
Although law in general can be described as a mode of address requiring human 
cognition and uptake, it is also a product of culture, linked with particular regions of 
production and application that have largely settled in relation to modern state 
forms.18 Monotheistic normativity locates law in a Western frame, from the Torah to 
Roman and canon law and through the modern period of legal codification.19 It does 
not appear to account for pre-colonial legal orders or other normative cosmologies, as 
it assumes a Judeo-Christian subjectivity that privileges individual consciousness in 
relation to the legal command.20 The figure of the sovereign sits behind the Western 
legal imaginary as a constituent and ordering power much like a monotheistic deity. 
This model of divine authority, positing the excarnate law that must be enfleshed 
through the subject, also serves as an analogue for secular sovereign authority, the 
structure underpinning contemporary legal systems around the world through a 
history of complex encounters between empires—an “interimperial legal politics”21—
as well as through the export and imposition of European legal ideologies, practices, 
and institutions across extra-European territories.  
Locating monotheistic normativity in this way suggests that law’s call is a 
product of historical formations that shape how, by whom, and under what material 
conditions it is received. In international law, the subject responding to law’s call has 
traditionally been the figure of the state—a composite of discrete and cognizing 
human subjects, yet with collective attribution of compliance or noncompliance to the 
state itself.22 Meanwhile the theological analogue of the sovereign is unsettled by 
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secular legal orders, which may entail more of a “partial, contested or shared 
sovereignty,”23 and much international legal theory has addressed the tensions that 
attend the creation of a legal order derived from unruly and differentially sovereign 
states.24 Critical scholarship in international law has noted how the dual fictions of 
sovereign equality and territorial integrity sustain the field’s colonial inheritance in 
present dynamics among states.25 
A contemporary instance of how international law is taken up by states in 
problematic and potentially neo-imperial ways may be illustrated through the critical 
lens of “contingent sovereignty,” a diagnosis of “the idea that in certain key 
circumstances—in particular, when states harbour terrorists or seek to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction—norms of sovereignty do not apply.”26 Here 
sovereignty is bound up with effective territorial control, and the international order is 
presented not as a constellation of sovereign equals, but rather as ranked by the 
relative capacity of states to handle threats within their own borders. This ideological 
framing of threat becomes political with the question of who determines this capacity, 
whether an international institution such as the United Nations, a set of strong states, 
or even an isolated hegemon. The “unable or unwilling” theory advanced by the 
United States in various policy documents and diplomatic circles is one such instance 
of “contingent sovereignty” used to justify defensive military interventions.27 For 
example, a leaked 2011 US Department of Justice white paper addressing the legality 
of a proposed targeted assassination of a US-Yemeni national asserted that 
a lethal operation in a foreign nation would be consistent with international 
legal principles of sovereignty and neutrality if it were conducted, for 
example, with the consent of the host nation’s government or after a 
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determination that the host nation is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat 
posed by the individual targeted.28 
This passive grammatical construction leaves open the prospect that the US may 
empower itself to make this determination, possibly in violation of the UN Charter.29 
As a claim to military intervention based on self-defense, the “unable or 
unwilling” theory is precisely the kind of logic that might be used to unleash LAWS 
upon a territory that is deemed “ungoverned” by a weak sovereign authority.30 Here 
the pliant contours of the “everywhere war”31 seemingly operate out of alignment 
with the vision of Westphalian sovereignty undergirding the international legal 
system. As Elden claims, “the complete or partial absence of sovereign power has 
been rescripted as a global danger, justifying intervention.”32 Absent sovereign 
equality and territorial integrity, the present political geography of the international 
legal order shares parallels with the hierarchical thinking of the “standard of 
civilization” logic used to justify territorial incursions throughout the colonial 
period.33 Is the end of (international) law to undo and equalize these imbalances, or is 
it perhaps too much a product of them to adequately provide redress? Even if LAWS 
could be brought under law, whose ends would this serve? 
If we grant that the structuring dynamics of law’s emergence continue to 
inform the present, then the history of the body of modern law governing armed 
conflict is consequential, as it is most often invoked in the scholarly literature as a 
possible framework for governing LAWS. This specific sub-field of international law 
emerged during the late colonial period as a means of restricting the violence of 
armed conflict between European powers.34 What is now referred to as international 
humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict underwent an initial process of 
codification through treaties in the mid- to late nineteenth century. During roughly the 
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same period, many of these powers were also engaged in finding potential treaty-
based solutions among themselves for preempting resource disputes outside Europe in 
what were or would become colonial territories. The period of treaty making that 
sought to restrict warfare between European powers also overlapped with the use of 
international legal forms to secure colonial possessions. For example, the General Act 
of the 1884–1885 Conference of Berlin declares that African territories “belonging 
to” a signatory shall remain neutral in the event that the signatory is involved in an 
armed conflict.35 The relevant treaty article advancing a “declaration of neutrality” 
formed part of a larger objective of parcelling out the African continent to European 
powers while preserving intra-European harmony and trading relations. Through the 
emerging law of armed conflict, as well as with international agreements around 
colonial possession, international law was produced in the interests of containing 
violence within and between certain entities while permitting its enactment elsewhere. 
This imbrication with colonial interests is consequential for the development 
of international humanitarian law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Historical efforts to regulate emerging methods and weapons of armed conflict in the 
interwar period harbored presumptions about which populations deserved protection, 
and in this context “civilians” primarily designated populations within intra-European 
conflicts to the exclusion of colonized non-combatants.36 Aspects of this thinking 
have continued into the present, where individuals receive differential treatment based 
upon categories such as population and territory. For example, scholars have noted 
how contemporary drone warfare has reinscribed colonial logics in the “vertical 
battlespace” above territory whose sovereignty is deemed conditional.37 
Anthropologist Hugh Gusterson contends that drones “can be used only against 
countries that lack the technological sophistication to shoot down the slow-moving 
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planes and whose internal affairs, conforming to Western stereotypes of ‘failed 
states,’ provide a pretext for incursion that is as persuasive to liberal interventionists 
today as the white man’s burden was to their Victorian ancestors.”38 Just as with the 
development of aerial bombardment in the early twentieth century, first enacted by an 
Italian aviator outside Tripoli, the emergence of armed drones around the turn of the 
millennium illustrates the technological asymmetry that will accompany the 
development of LAWS as well. Contemporary asymmetries develop in a context 
where conceptions of territory appear less attached to traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty, whether through notions of “contingent sovereignty” or the 
“responsibility to protect.” 
The challenge of thinking through LAWS is the challenge of speculative 
reasoning more broadly, but as a field that responds to the new by way of analogy, 
law would approach LAWS by considering relations of likeness in bringing them 
under its jurisdiction.39 The development of LAWS is meant to increase targeting 
precision and to mitigate the risk to a state’s own population, including its military 
personnel, which makes it analogous in certain respects to the use of armed drones. 
Recent scholarship notes how “[u]nmanned or human-replacing weapons systems first 
took the form of armed drones and other remote-controlled devices,” enabling human 
absence from the battlefield.40 As with armed drones, however, the development of 
AI-based weapons systems would deepen the asymmetry of modern warfare, as some 
states and their attendant populations are able to mitigate risk more readily than others 
through further technological development. Within states, it may be that the risk 
burden is shifted from the military to civilians, as Grégoire Chamayou points out in 
relation to armed drones: “The paradox is that hyperprotection of military personnel 
tends to compromise the traditional social division of danger in which soldiers are at 
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risk and civilians are protected. By maximizing the protection of military lives and 
making the inviolability of its ‘safe zone’ the mark of its power, a state that uses 
drones tends to divert reprisals toward its own population.”41 
At stake in practice is not only whether LAWS can be subsumed under law, a 
philosophical matter entailing what law requires as a cognitive response, but also the 
extent to which relevant law could be applicable and made to apply as a matter of 
(geo)politics. Noll’s argument stands with regard to law and the inhuman, yet against 
the backdrop of this uneven history and corresponding geographies of power, the 
human subject who incarnates the law appears as a privileged bearer of enforceable 
protections. If the law at stake is the law of armed conflict, as much scholarly debate 
around LAWS presumes, then the most important addressees of this law are strong 
states and their military personnel.42 The resulting hierarchical framing would seem to 
place military over civilians, as Chamayou notes; between civilians, the populations 
of sovereign states are prioritized over those whose sovereignty is “contingent” or 
otherwise compromised. 
It is inherent to this body of law that it inscribes these distinctions, as the law 
governing armed conflict notoriously enables a degree of violence even as it attempts 
to constrain it. As with humanitarianism more broadly, where beneficiaries are 
classified and managed according to particular governing logics,43 international 
humanitarian law categorizes its subjects in ways that produce attendant hierarchies of 
life. The central principle of proportionality explicitly justifies the loss of civilian life 
as balanced against military necessity. This has led some commentators to observe 
how the law governing armed conflict in fact produces an “economy of violence” in 
which (state) violence is managed according to “an economy of calculations and 
justified as the least possible means.”44 The development of LAWS not only reflects 
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an effort to improve upon fallible human systems, as its proponents claim, but also to 
minimize risk to certain actors, particularly citizens of powerful states or members of 
their militaries. As Sven Lindqvist darkly observes, “[t]he laws of war protect 
enemies of the same race, class, and culture. The laws of war leave the foreign and the 
alien without protection.”45 
While scholars of international humanitarian law might contest Lindqvist’s 
claim that discrimination is inscribed into the laws themselves, their selective and 
discriminatory enforcement is widely noted. As with the “unable or unwilling” theory 
advanced by the US, among other highly militarized states such as Canada, Australia, 
and Turkey, exceptions to the international legal framework have been asserted 
through the same legal terminology.46 Within this logic, the map of the world appears 
divided between states that are able to exert control over their territories and others 
that struggle, often for reasons tied to the residues of colonial governance structures 
and continuing economic exploitation. The experiment of LAWS will likely play out 
to the benefit of the former upon the territory of the latter, much as some populations 




The technological developments informing the emergence of new weapons systems 
for armed conflict are not only employed to minimize risk to particular populations, 
as I described above. They also illustrate a particular relationship to time, one that 
philosopher and communications theorist Brian Massumi characterizes as an 
“operative logic” or “tendency” of preemption.48 Preemption emerges prominently in 
the US with the administration of George W. Bush and the so-called “war on terror,” 
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but Massumi contends that it is not restricted to this historical moment or location. As 
with Noll’s attention to algorithmic forms and code as the background thinking that 
shapes the turn to LAWS, Massumi is attuned to preemption as a temporal feature of 
our contemporary landscape. In non-military applications such as high frequency 
trading, algorithms are employed to hasten response time and “to get to the front of 
the electronic queue” in submitting, cancelling, and modifying purchasing orders.49 In 
military settings they also enable faster data analysis, but an analysis oriented toward 
threat assessment, which brings them into a relationship with this preemptive 
tendency. 
Characterized by a concern for threats and security, preemption produces a 
surplus value of threat tied to an ominous sense of indeterminacy: “Being in the thick 
of war has been watered down and drawn out into an endless waiting, both sides 
poised for action.”50 The experience of temporality is of increasingly condensed 
intervals, accompanied by a will to preemptively modulate “action potential” and to 
draw out the risk-mitigating capacity of laying claim to smaller units of time. The 
political dream at stake is to “own” time in the sense of exerting increasing mastery 
over ever-smaller units of it. Massumi writes that in “network-centric” contemporary 
warfare, 
the “real time” of war is now the formative infra-instant of suspended 
perception. What are normally taken to be cognitive functions must telescope 
into that non-conscious interval. What would otherwise be cognition must 
zoom into the “blink” between consciously registered perceptions—and in the 
same moment zoom instantly out into a new form of awareness, a new 
collective consciousness.51 
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Such thinking illustrates the presumptive need to augment human capacity on the 
battlefield, whether through algorithmic enhancement of human cognition by machine 
intelligence or through neurotechnology’s combination of algorithms with human 
biological/neural capacities. This raises the question of the role for human judgment 
in relation to the non-conscious interval, the “blink” between the human capacity to 
perceive and act. If delegated to the machine, what arises is not comprehension and 
judgment but rather what Arendt called “brain power,” as distinct from the workings 
of a mind or intellect. “Electronic brains share with all other machines the capacity to 
do man’s work better and faster than man,” she noted, yet carrying out their assigned 
tasks does not constitute the exercise of judgment.52 Writing over half a century ago, 
Arendt warned of the risk of losing sight of humanist considerations in the frenzied 
technological drive to secure an Archimedean point beyond the human, yet the human 
seems inescapable, “less likely ever to meet anything but himself and man-made 
things the more ardently he wishes to eliminate all anthropocentric considerations 
from his encounter with the non-human world around him.”53 It would seem that what 
is distinct here, in Noll’s diagnosis of the thinking that undergirds the prospect of 
algorithmic warfare, is the prospect of breaking free from the human through the 
singularity. 
While I noted at the outset that LAWS at this stage are speculative and futural, 
incremental steps have been taken in their development. Both AI and 
neurotechnological dimensions are apparent in a recent program of the US Defense 
Department, initially known as the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team and 
informally as “Project Maven,” which was launched in April of 2017 with the 
objective of accelerating the department’s integration of big data, AI, and machine 
learning to produce “actionable intelligence.” Maven is the inaugural project of this 
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“algorithmic warfare” initiative in the US military.54 While this program is focused on 
intelligence rather than weapons systems, characterized by a human-in-the-loop rather 
than a human-out-of-the-loop form of LAWS, the underlying algorithmic thinking is 
the same. The use of drones for combat also evolved out of intelligence gathering, and 
critics of the integration of AI into military operations would have cause for concern 
about Project Maven paving the way—perhaps unintentionally—for future LAWS. 
The Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team emerged in the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and was later brought under a new “Joint 
Artificial Intelligence Center” in the Defense Department.55 The project forms part of 
the “third offset” or “3OS” strategy to protect US military advantage against rivals 
such as China and Russia, a strategy developed in 2014 to draw upon new 
technological capabilities in developing “collaborative human-machine battle 
networks that synchronize simultaneous operations in space, air, sea, undersea, 
ground, and cyber domains.”56 What Massumi points out as a desire to maximize 
“action potential” in ever-smaller units of time is evident here: the concern with 
bringing operations into a simultaneous harmony among different parties to the 
assemblage helps the military to “own time” more forcefully, and with it, to gain 
advantage over its military competitors.  
The memorandum establishing Project Maven in 2017 emphasizes the need to 
“move much faster” in employing technological developments, with its aim “to turn 
the enormous volume of data available to DoD into actionable intelligence and 
insights at speed.”57 Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work describes relevant 
activities as 90-day “sprints”: after the project team provides computer vision 
algorithms “for object detection, classification, and alerts for [full-motion video 
processing, exploitation and dissemination],” he notes, “[f]urther sprints will 
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incorporate more advanced computer vision technology.”58 Among other things, 
Project Maven trains AI to recognize potential targets in drone footage by focusing on 
“computer vision,” or the aspect of machine learning that autonomously extracts 
objects of interest from moving or still imagery using neural methods that are inspired 
by biology. Public statements of military personnel involved in the project distance it 
from autonomous weapons or autonomous surveillance systems, claiming instead that 
they are attempting to “free up time” so that humans can focus on other tasks: “we 
don’t want them to have to stare and count anymore.”59 
The Department of Defense tells the narrative of Project Maven’s emergence 
as a story of augmentation: of supplementing the labor of an overwhelmed, 
temporally lagging workforce with specialized entities that will help to speed up data 
processing. Speaking in July of 2017, the chief of the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-
Functional Team claimed that AI would be used to “complement the human 
operator”;60 elsewhere machines are presented as “teammates” paired with humans to 
“capitalize on the unique capabilities that each brings to bear.” These teammates 
would work “symbiotically” toward a shared end: namely, “to increase the ability of 
weapons systems to detect objects.”61 Figure 5.1, an icon appearing in a presentation 
by a Project Maven participant, oscillates between the benign and the absurd.62 
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Figure 5.1  Image source: Tom Simonite, ‘Pentagon will expand AI project prompting 




Intent aside, this depiction of harmless machines employed “to help” appearing in a 
Defense Department presentation on Project Maven raises the question of who stands 
to benefit and who may suffer from this cybernetic experiment. That it unfolds 
incrementally rather than through the direct development of LAWS—on the grounds 
of assisting overworked employees and with the objective of creating greater 
precision, a humanitarian end in line with the laws of armed conflict—does not 
diminish the pressing need to reflect upon the development of these practices through 
a machine-independent evaluation.  
  As of December 2017, Project Maven’s machine augmentation of the slow 
human intelligence analyst was reportedly being used to support intelligence 
operations in Africa and the Middle East.63 Such spaces of contemporary armed 
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conflict are laden with histories of colonial intervention and technological 
experimentation in warfare; here the smiling robots appear far more sinister. Bringing 
location and temporality together, the project seeks to process information more 
quickly than human consciousness in order to avoid delayed responses to changing 
circumstances on hostile and high-risk territory abroad, where human inhabitants 
appear as the source of risk to remote populations on whose behalf the intelligence is 
being gathered. There is a lingering question of what constituency this project serves: 
in a statement shortly after its founding, the chief of Project Maven stated that the 
team was exploring “[how] best to engage industry [to] advantage the taxpayer and 
the warfighter, who wants the best algorithms that exist to augment and complement 
the work he does.”64 
Within this vision, the machine augments the human and private enterprise 
figures as a resource for the military. In 2015 the Defense Department established a 
Defense Innovation Unit in Silicon Valley, California, “to partner with private 
industry to rapidly source private industry AI solutions to military problem sets.”65 
The initiative draws private-sector expertise into military development, as has long 
been the practice in the US, but with apparently greater urgency. Robert Work’s 
memorandum establishing Project Maven makes no mention of private-sector 
assistance apart from an oblique reference to the need to “field technology” for 
augmenting existing operations. Yet according to military academics, forming 
partnerships with private-sector actors is regarded as “key to obtaining the technology 
required to implement the 3OS. Many of the advancements in AI and other emerging 
technologies are a result of significant investment by private industry for commercial 
applications.”66 By March 2018, the skilled “partner” referenced in various press 
releases was revealed to be Google.67 
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The disclosure prompted widespread protests among Google employees. Some 
employees resigned, and thousands of others signed a petition demanding termination 
of the Project Maven contract.68 In response the corporation not only decided against 
renewing their contract; it also disseminated “principles for AI” that state the 
company would not develop intelligence for weapons or surveillance. In contrast to 
the military’s urgent desire to hasten its conquest of ever-smaller units of processing 
time to preempt threats, the resistance is located in a different form of preemption: 
namely, preventing their complicity in producing an untenable future. The arc of this 
temporal horizon appears longer and more generalized, extending beyond the 
specifics of comparative military advantage gained by “owning” more of the “blink” 
between perception and response, and looking instead to the risks that algorithmic 
autonomy might bring.69 Extending Massumi’s argument illustrates how the 
preemptive tendency produces the fear that leads to the prospect of developing LAWS 
to combat future threats. But another preemptive response is possible: namely, an 
ethico-political preemption of the threat LAWS pose to the primacy of human 
judgment. 
What this response reveals is both a kind of military vulnerability and the 
power of (human, political) judgment. The military-private hybrid appears as a 
dystopian assemblage of for-profit warfare technology development, but it also seems 
to open a space for contestation through the power of laboring humans. Here 
resistance is not read as insubordination to be punished, as in the military, but rather 
as talent to be lost in a privileged sector of the economy. Other contractors have and 
will engage with what Google abandoned, and the extent of the corporation’s 
withdrawal from military projects remains unclear.70 But the petition’s language of 
accountability beyond law—of morality and ethics, responsibility, and trust—sets 
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terms for political resistance. To the internal corporate slogan adopted by the petition 
signatories—“don’t be evil”—the military would respond that its development of AI 
technologies is in fact the lesser evil.71 But as we know from critical accounts of 
international humanitarian law, the logic of the lesser evil is embedded within this 
law, as it is within the principle of proportionality.72 In this sense, the military only 
builds upon a structure already present within the law itself, with its attendant forms 
of humanitarian sacrifice. 
When it comes to the question of whether to use international law to ban 
LAWS, the US adopts a delayed approach to legal temporality: it wishes to proceed 
with “deliberation and patience,” and to highlight how it is important “not to make 
hasty judgments about the value or likely effects of emerging or future technologies . . 
. our views of new technologies may change over time as we find new uses and ways 
to benefit from advances in technology.”73 It is too soon to judge, and yet it is not 
soon enough to develop the technologies that may later become unmoored from the 
power to judge and constrain them. Initiatives such as Project Maven are presented as 
working in the pursuit of humanitarian ends, yet this is what Talal Asad might call a 
“humanitarianism that uses violence to subdue violence.”74 The law that we might 
seek to subsume LAWS under is complicit as well. 
The logic of preemption could be transformed into an ethical call, as a form of 
political resistance in the present. Legal solutions in the form of regulatory or ban 
treaties may come too late to integrate well into the already unfolding narrative. 
Turning the preemptive logic of the military strike on its head, this ethical preemption 
would seek to undo the hastening of present efforts to adapt algorithmic thinking for 
military ends. The political urgency is even more pressing as Project Maven continues 
to unfold, with further contracts awarded to a start-up firm whose founder, a former 
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virtual-reality headset developer, described the future battlefield as populated by 
“superhero” soldiers who “have the power of perfect omniscience over their area of 
operations, where they know where every enemy is, every friend is, every asset is.”75 
As Noll notes, the plurality of actors involved in this assemblage of military 
production makes it challenging to parse responsibility—both in a dystopian future 
where automated weapons make targeting decisions, but also in the present 
development of AI for military use. The relationships within the military-corporate 
assemblage will continue to push toward the singularity in incremental steps, whether 
intentionally or not. The exercise of human judgment through a politics of refusal 
may push back more forcefully than a law steeped in humanitarian violence.  
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